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We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We
selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them
in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability, and
Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression
style, question formats) that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second,
we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that
emotional arousal in response to moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors
Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set
confirming that people’s moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to
their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining
also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment.
Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing
the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the
importance of cross-cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition,
we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish,
Catalan, and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set.
Keywords: moral dilemmas, moral judgment, decision making, cross cultural, DPHMJ
“. . . but what happens when we are exposed to totally new and
unfamiliar settings where our habits don’t suffice?”
Philip Zimbardo (2007); The Lucifer Effect, p. 6
INTRODUCTION
Moral dilemmas have become a standard methodology for
research on moral judgment. Moral dilemmas are hypothetical
short stories which describe a situation in which two conflicting
moral reasons are relevant; for instance, the duty not to kill, and
the duty to help. By inducing the participants to make a forced
choice between these two reasons, it can be investigated which
reason is given precedence in a particular situation, and which
features of the situation matter for that decision. Accordingly, we
assume that this kind of hypothetical “ticking bomb scenarios”
can help to disentangle what determines human moral judgment.
This is, however, only possible if themoral dilemmas are very well
designed and potentially relevant factors are controlled for. The
aim of this paper is to provide a set of such carefully designed and
validated moral dilemmas.
The moral dilemmas commonly used in Cognitive
Neuroscience experiments are based on what Foot (1967)
and Thomson (1976) called the “Trolley Problem.” The trolley
dilemma has two main versions. In the first one, a runaway
trolley is heading for five railway workers who will be killed if
the trolley pursues its course. The experimental participant is
asked to take the perspective of a protagonist in the story who
can choose the option to leap in and to pull a switch which will
redirect the trolley onto a different track and save the five railway
workers. However, redirected onto the other track, the trolley
will kill one railway worker who would otherwise not have been
killed. In an alternative version of the dilemma, the action the
protagonist has to perform in order to stop the trolley is different.
This time, there is no switch but a large stranger who is standing
on a bridge over the tracks. The protagonist can now choose to
push that person with his hands onto the tracks so that the large
body stops the train. The outcome is the same: five individuals
saved by sacrificing one. However, participants in this task more
easily consent to pull the switch while they are much more
reluctant to push the stranger with their own hands. The “action”
that the protagonist of the story can choose to carry out—or
not—is termed a moral transgression or moral violation. The
choice itself, between the act of committing or omitting to carry
out the moral transgression is a moral judgment. The decision to
commit the harm is referred to as an utilitarian moral judgment,
because it weights costs and benefits, while the decision to refrain
from harm is a deontological moral judgment, because it gives
more weight to the “not to kill” principle.
The influential work of Greene et al. (2001), which intro-
duced moral dilemmas into Cognitive Neuroscience, has been
followed by many other studies as a way to deepen our under-
standing of the role of emotion in moral judgment (for a review,
see Christensen and Gomila, 2012). However, results obtained
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with this methodological approach have been heterogeneous,
and there is a lack of consensus regarding how to interpret
them.
In our opinion, one of the main reasons for this lays in
the simple fact that the majority of studies have relied on the
initial set of moral dilemmas devised by Greene et al. (2001).
While this set indisputably provided invaluable evidence about
the neural underpinnings ofmoral judgment, it was not validated.
Thus, conceptual pitfalls and formulation errors have poten-
tially remained unchallenged (Christensen and Gomila, 2012).
In fact, one of the key findings that have been reported (i.e.,
emotional involvement in moral judgment) might have been due
to uncontrolled variations in the dilemma formulations, rather
than to the factors supposedly taken into account (i.e., personal
vs. impersonal versions of the dilemma). As a matter of fact,
Greene and colleagues themselves have worded constructive self-
criticism with respect to that initial dilemma set and suggested
using only a subset of the initial dilemmas, however, without vali-
dating them either (Greene et al., 2009). Still, researchers continue
to use this initial set. Here we present our efforts to remedy this
situation.
We have fine-tuned a set of dilemmas methodologically and
conceptually (controlling four conceptual factors). The set was
selected from previously used moral dilemma sets: (i) Greene
et al. (2001, 2004) and (ii) Moore et al. (2008) (this set was
based on Greene et al.’s but optimized). Both sets have been
used in a wealth of studies, however, without previous valida-
tion (e.g., Royzman and Baron, 2002; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moore
et al., 2008, 2011a,b). After the dilemma fine-tuning, norming
values were obtained for each dilemma: (i) of arousal and valence
(to ascertain the differential involvement of emotional processes
along the dimensions of the 4 conceptual factors) and (ii) of
moral judgment (to confirm that moral judgment is sensitive to
the four factors)1. Finally, in the Supplementary Material of this
work, we provide the new set in six languages: English, French,
Spanish, German, Danish, and Catalan in order to make it more
readily available for cross-cultural studies in the field. Please note
that the norming study was carried out with the Spanish dilemma
version. We encourage norming studies in the other languages
(and in other cultures).
DILEMMA “FINE-TUNING”—PROPOSAL OF AN OPTIMIZED
SET
All dilemmas included in this set involved the decision to carry
out a moral transgression which would result in a better overall
numerical outcome. The participant was always the protagonist of
this action (the moral transgression)2 and all dilemmas involved
killing (i.e., all social and other physical harm dilemmas were
eliminated). Furthermore, of the initial 48 dilemmas, 2 were elim-
inated (the personal and impersonal versions of the cliffhanger
dilemma) due to the unlikely acrobatics they involve.
1Please note that study with a preliminary version of the revised set has
recently been published (Christensen et al., 2012).
2For a detailed description of the dilemmas, see also Moore et al. (2008). For
clarity it should be said that these 48 dilemmas are made up of 24 different
short stories, which have a personal and an impersonal version each.
In what follows we outline the changes we have made regard-
ing (i) the instructions given to the participant (subsection
Instructions to the Participant); (ii) the dilemma design, i.e., adjust-
ment of dilemma length, expression style, etc. (subsectionDilemma
Design (1)—Formulation), (iii) the dilemma conceptualization,
i.e., thorough adaptation to the conceptual factors of Personal
Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability, and Intentionality (subsection
Dilemma Design (2)—Conceptual Factors), and (iv) the formula-
tion of the question eliciting the moral judgment (subsection The
Question Prompting theMoral Judgment). In the end, we have pro-
duced 23 dilemmas with two versions each, one personal and one
impersonal, 46 dilemmas in total.
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PARTICIPANT
To increase verisimilitude, we suggest that instructions at the
beginning of the experiment ideally emphasize that participants
are going to read short stories about difficult situations as they
are likely to appear in the news or in the radio (for instance:
“in the following you will read a series of short stories about dif-
ficult interpersonal situations, similar to those that we all see on
the news every day or may read about in a novel”) (Christensen
and Gomila, 2012, p. 14). This may help to put the participants
“in context” for the task that awaits them. In addition, instruc-
tions could include a remark about the fact that participants will
be offered one possible solution to the situation, and that their
task will be to judge whether the proposed solution is acceptable,
given the information available (such as: “for each of the difficult
situations a solution will be proposed. Your task is to judge whether
to accept or not this solution”). Indeed, the closure of options
or alternatives is important. However, in previous dilemma sets,
some dilemmas have included expressions such as “the only way
to avoid [death of more people] is to [action proposal],” while
other dilemmas did not. Whereas this is important information,
including that same sentence in all dilemmas could make the
reading rather repetitive and result in habituation. On the other
hand, including it only in some dilemmas could bias participants’
responses to these dilemmas with respect to the others. Therefore,
we suggest presenting it only in the general instructions to the
participants.
DILEMMA DESIGN (1)—FORMULATION
Control for formal characteristics of dilemma formulation
includes:
Word count
Word count across dilemma categories: in the original sets the
dilemmas were rather long. This can entail an excessively long
experimental session, resulting in participant fatigue. In Moore
et al. (2008) an effort was made to control for mean word
count: the Personal moral dilemmas (PMD) had 168.9 words
and Impersonal moral dilemmas 169.3 (IMD). The maximum
word count of a dilemma was 254 and the minimum was 123.
We shortened the dilemmas removing information that was not
strictly necessary and equalized the expression style of personal
and impersonal versions of each dilemma. For instance, technical
terms and long, non-familiar words were removed. Now the first
three sentences of each dilemma are almost the same for both ver-
sions of a dilemma (personal and impersonal). For instance, the
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English version of the new dilemma set has a mean word count of
130 words in the Personal and 135 in the Impersonalmoral dilem-
mas. Our maximum number of words in a dilemma is 169 and
the minimum 93. See the Supplementary Material for the word
counts for each translation.
Framing effects
A framing effect consists in that people may judge one and
the same situation differently, just because of the way it is
described (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Petrinovich et al.,
1993). Specifically, a clear risk of framing effects concerns the
use of “kill” in some dilemmas, but “save” in others. People feel
more inclined to choose inaction when kill is used, and more
inclined toward action when save is emphasized (Petrinovich
and O’Neill, 1996). To avoid this, in all dilemmas the words kill
and save are used in the second paragraph where the partici-
pant is given the information about the proposed action (i.e.,
the moral transgression) and its consequences. Conversely, the
words are removed from the question (e.g., Rescue 911 scenario:
instead of Is it appropriate for you to kill this injured person
in order to save yourself and everyone else on board? the action
verbs throw and keep were used). It is important to highlight
the trade-off between cost (throw someone) and benefit (keep
yourself and more people in the air) in the questions of all
dilemmas. This was not accounted for in any of the previous
dilemma sets.
Situational antecedents
In the original dilemma sets, keeping the situational antecedent
used to present the characters constant was not accounted for.
Thus, in the Personal version of the Nuclear reactor dilemma
the situational antecedent could bias the participants’ responses:
you are the inspector of a nuclear power plant that you suspect
has not met its safety requirements. The plant foreman and you
are touring the facility when one of the nuclear fuel rods over-
heats. . . Later, it is this same foreman you are asked to consider
to push into the fuel rod assembly. The participant was given
knowledge about a badly kept nuclear plant, with an in-charge
individual who did not bother to make the plant meet the safety
requirements. This makes it easier to sacrifice the plant fore-
man to save the city than to sacrifice another, random, innocent
person—which is the option to consider in all other dilemmas.
Hence, prior information about the state of the power plant was
removed, so that the foreman has no overt responsibility for the
nuclear accident which is about to happen. Now he is a “random”
person to be sacrificed, like in the other dilemmas. The Nobel
Prize dilemma had a similar problem. A situational antecedent
made the person in a position to be sacrificed (here, your fellow
researcher) appear a greedy bad person, so that it may be eas-
ier to sacrifice him than another innocent fellow researcher. The
dilemma was reformulated so that the fellow researcher appeared
not to know that the potential buyers would use the invention
as a weapon and only the protagonist explicitly knows it and is
now again the only person with the possibility to prevent greater
harm from happening. In total, four dilemmas were modified to
keep constant the situational antecedents of the characters in the
dilemmas.
Trade-off
Trade-off across dilemmas: previous sets mixed different kinds of
moral transgressions, like stealing or lying. It is important not to
mix them with killing, in order to avoid the risk of a non-desired
carry-over effect between dilemmas. For instance, stealing, lying,
or lack of respect, may elicit less severe judgments when killing
is also present in other dilemmas of the set, than when it’s not.
Therefore, all dilemmas now raise the conflict between the option
to kill a person in order to save a larger number of people, and
the option of doing nothing and letting that larger number of
people die.
Number of individuals
Number of individuals saved if the moral transgression is carried
out: in the set there now are the following categories (i) 5–10 peo-
ple, (ii) 11–50 people, (iii) 100–150 people and (iv) “thousands”
of people or “masses” of people. It is an important variable to
control for. A utilitarian response should become easier as more
people are saved. Conversely, if moral judgment is purely deonto-
logical, the number of people saved is totally irrelevant. This is an
interesting question to have as a working hypothesis. Using dif-
ferent amounts of “saved individuals” in the formulations of the
dilemmas allows researchers to explore at which point the posi-
tive consequences outweigh the transgression required to obtain
them. For instance, it has been shown that attachment (“close-
ness of relationship”) to the victim determines moral judgment
more than the number of beneficiaries involved. Still, this ques-
tion needs further research, once closeness is controlled for (Tassy
et al., 2013). In this work, however, no specific analysis of this
variable will be made, as it exceeds the limits of this norming
study.
Information
Information supplied about the certainty of the consequences for
the story character impersonated by the participant: in the Tycoon
and Nobel Prize dilemmas it said that “if you decide to [action of
the dilemma], nobody will ever find out.” This implies informa-
tion about the future which cannot really be given with certainty,
while at the same time contrasting with other stories where no
such commitments about the future are made. This kind of infor-
mation can bias moral judgment and confuse it with legal pun-
ishment (or its lack). Therefore, this information was removed
altogether from the dilemmas. Similarly, dilemmas were excluded
that cannot be understood without the assumption of an extraor-
dinary ability or an unlikely event (such as the Cliffhanger)3.
DILEMMA DESIGN (2)—CONCEPTUAL FACTORS
On the grounds of the literature about moral judgment
(Christensen and Gomila, 2012), four main factors need to be
controlled for in moral dilemma formulation: Personal Force,
Benefit Recipient (who gets the benefit), Evitability (whether the
death is avoidable, or not), and Intentionality (whether the harm
is willed and used instrumentally or a side-effect).
3We also considered removing the Bike Week Dilemma due to the act of acro-
batics that it involves, but finally left it in. However, we encourage researchers
to potentially reconsider this.
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Personal force
Initially, Greene et al. (2001, 2004) defined a Personal moral
dilemma as one in which the proposed moral transgression sat-
isfied three criteria: (i) the transgression leads to serious bodily
harm; (ii) this harm befalls a particular person or group of
people; and (iii) the harm is not the result of deflecting an exist-
ing threat onto a different party. Subsequently, Cushman et al.
(2006) remarked that the crucial feature in a personal dilemma
is whether physical contact between the victim and the aggressor
is involved; a point also emphasized by Abarbanell and Hauser
(2010), while Waldmann and Dieterich (2007) focused on the
Locus of Intervention (focus on the victim or on the threat) as the
difference between personal and impersonal dilemmas. Another
proposal contended that the difference between Personal and
Impersonal is whether the action is mechanically mediated or not
(Royzman and Baron, 2002; Moore et al., 2008). In more recent
work, Greene et al. have tried to offer an integrative definition
(Greene, 2008; Greene et al., 2009). Specifically, these authors
propose that a Personal moral transgression occurs when (i) the
force that impacts the victim is generated by the agent’s muscles,
(ii) it cannot be mediated by mechanisms that respond to the
agent’s muscular force by releasing or generating a different kind
of force and applying it to the other person, and (iii) it cannot be
executed with guns, levers, explosions, gravity. . .
However, it seems as if this redefinition is driven by an effort
to keep the interpretation of the initial results, which results in
a circular argument: that “personal” dilemmas induce deonto-
logical judgments by emotional activation, while “impersonal”
ones induce utilitarian judgments by rational calculation. Yet, it is
not yet clear which aspect of the personal involvement influences
moral judgment through emotional activation, nor is it clear
which kind of moral relevance emotions elicited by one’s involve-
ment may have in the judgment. Similar considerations apply to
the introduction of the distinction between “high-conflict” and
“low-conflict” dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007), which also seem
based on ex-post-facto considerations.
A principled way to clarify this distinction is in terms of the
causal role of the agent in the production of the harm. What
makes a dilemma impersonal is that the agent just initiates a pro-
cess that, through its own dynamics, ends up causing the harm;
while a dilemma is personal when the agent is required not just
to start the action, but to carry it out by herself. According to
this view, the presence of mediating instruments, by itself, does
not make a dilemma personal or impersonal. It depends of the
kind of active involvement of the agent they require and amounts
to a difference in her responsibility of the caused harm, and in
the resulting (felt) emotional experience of it. This can account
for the different moral judgments to Personal and Impersonal
Dilemmas, which are observed despite the fact that the same
consequences occur. The best philosophical explanation of this
difference is Anders (1962)’s reflection on the mass murders on
the Second World War. He contended that these acts were made
possible by the technical innovations that reduced the active
involvement of soldiers in the killing to pushing a button to
release a bomb. It is not just that the new arms were of massive
destruction, but that their use was easier for us humans. Killing
with one’s hands is not just slower, but harder.
In the present dilemma set, the Personal dilemmas have been
revised accordingly. Personal Moral Dilemmas now require that
the agent is directly involved in the production of the harm.
Impersonal Moral Dilemmas are those in which the agent is only
indirectly involved in the process that results in the harm.
Benefit recipient
Self-interest is a well-known influence in moral judgments
(Bloomfield, 2007). People will be more prone to accept an
action whose consequences benefit themselves (i.e., the agent her-
self) than one that benefits others, maybe complete strangers.
This “Self-Beneficial” vs. “Other Beneficial” contrast has been
introduced more clearly in the revised set. We reformulated the
Modified Euthanasia dilemma due to a confound in the trade-off
specification. Therefore, as the dilemma had to be an Other-
beneficial dilemma, now the key secret evidence the soldier could
reveal if tortured is the location of a particularly important base
camp (and not the camp of the protagonist’s group).
Evitability
This variable regards whether the death produced by the moral
transgression is described as Avoidable or Inevitable. Would the
person “to be sacrificed” have died anyway (Inevitable harm),
or not (avoidable harm)? Transgressions that lead to inevitable
consequences are more likely to be morally acceptable, by the
principle of lesser evil (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007). In the
dilemma Rescue 911, a technical error in a helicopter puts the
protagonist in the situation of having to decide to throw off one
of her patients for the helicopter to lose weight. Without that
sacrifice the helicopter would fall and everybody—including that
one patient—would die. Conversely, the dilemma can also be
formulated in such a way that the individual to be sacrificed oth-
erwise would not have been harmed (Avoidable death), such as
in the classical trolley dilemmas, where neither the bystander nor
the innocent railway worker on the side track would have been
harmed if the protagonist had not changed the course of events.
This distinction has now been made more explicit in the dilem-
mas (for examples of work where this variable was discussed, see
Moore et al., 2008; Huebner et al., 2011).
Intentionality
This factor refers to whether the harm is produced instrumentally,
as something willed, or whether it happens as an unforeseen side-
effect, as collateral damage, to an action whose goal is positive.
This variable concerns the doctrine of the double effect that has
been shown to be psychologically relevant (Foot, 1967; Hauser,
2006; Mikhail, 2007). Causing harm is more acceptable when it
is produced as collateral damage, than when it is the goal of an
action. Accordingly, Accidental harm refers to the case where the
innocent victim of the dilemma dies as a non-desired side effect
of the moral transgression that the protagonist carries out to save
others. Conversely, Instrumental harm occurs when the protago-
nist intentionally uses the harm (i.e., the death) of the innocent
victim as a means (i.e., instrumentally) to save the others.
The reformulation of the dilemmas and the fine-tuning
according to this factor is particularly relevant and one of the
main contributions of this norming paper. In the modified set
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of Moore et al. (2008), all Personal dilemmas were Instrumental,
while Impersonal dilemmas included six Instrumental and six
Accidental. The present set now allows a full factorial design
including intentionality. To introduce Accidental vs. Instrumental
harm in Personal dilemmas attention was paid to key aspects of
the causal chain of the dilemma leading to the proposed salvation
of the greatest number of people. First, the exact intention that
the protagonist has in the very moment of committing the moral
transgression was identified (does she carry out an action with
the intention to kill or not?). Second, a differentiation was made
between whether the harm is directly produced by the protagonist,
or indirectly triggered by her action (do the positive consequences
(the salvation of many) follow directly from the victim’s death,
or by some other event, an independent mechanism which was
triggered by the protagonist’s actions but not directly by her, nor
directly willed by her?). The final point concerned by what means
the larger number of people is saved (are they saved directly by
the death of the victim, or for a different reason?).
Following this rationale, for a better comprehension of the
Intentionality factor, the moral transgression is divided into a
5-part causal chain. This helps to disentangle the Accidental-
Instrumental dichotomy (see Figure 1). The first thing to identify
is the action by the protagonist (what exactly does she do?). Second,
which is the exact intention behind that action (why exactly does
she do it?)? Third, does the victim die by the intervention of some
intermediate (and protagonist-independent) mechanism or is the
death directly due to the action of the protagonist (does she kill
directly or by an independent mechanism?)? Fourth, how does the
innocent victim die (how does she die?)? Fifth, how is the larger
number of people saved (are they saved due to the death of the
victim or for some other reason?)?
To summarize the four factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient,
Evitability, and Intentionality, the illustration in Figure 2 provides
a schematic overview over how the four factors are presented to
the participant during the course of a moral dilemma.
THE QUESTION PROMPTING THE MORAL JUDGMENT
The formulation of the final question to elicit the moral judg-
ment after reading the dilemma has also given rise to some
controversy. The problem of the influence that the type of ques-
tion exerts on participant’s moral judgments has been addressed
empirically (e.g., O’Hara et al., 2010). Four question formats
were used: wrong, inappropriate, forbidden, and blameworthy and
found that people judged moral transgressions more severely
when the words “wrong” or “inappropriate” were part of the
formulation, than when the words “forbidden” or “blamewor-
thy” were used. Another study found different behavioral effects
following the questions Is it wrong to. . . ? vs. Would you? (Borg
et al., 2006). The question Would you. . . ? resulted in faster RTs in
judging moral scenarios as compared to judgments of non-moral
scenarios, while the question Is it wrong to. . . ? did not show any
differences in RT comparing the moral to the non-moral condi-
tion. In view of these findings, it seems that deciding what to do
is not processed in the same way as deciding whether an action
is right or wrong, and that in moral dilemmas is the first that
matters.
In recent work, two groups of researchers have addressed the
related issue of whether “what we say is also what we do.” Thus,
it was found that answering the question Is it acceptable to. . . ? vs.
the question Would you. . . ? resulted in differential response ten-
dencies (Tassy et al., 2013). However, another study showed that
increasing the contextual information available to the participant
FIGURE 1 | Example of the causal chain of the proposed moral
transgression that leads to the salvation. In the Instrumental version of
the Burning Building dilemma the proposed action is “to use the body of the
victim.” The intention is “use the body to break down burning debris.” The
victim dies directly by the fire and there is no independent mechanism in
between. A larger number of people are saved due to the fact that the
burning debris was eliminated with the victim. The harm to the victim was
thus used as a means to save others. Said in different words, the body of the
victim was literally used instrumentally with the intention to free the trapped
group. Conversely, in the Accidental version of the Iceberg dilemma, the
action of the protagonist is “to push the emergency access hatch.” The
intention behind that action is “to make the oxygen flow to the upper section
of the boat.” The victim dies due to a knock on the head by an independent
mechanism which is the falling down of the hatch. Thus, the victim dies as a
side-effect of the act of salvation that the protagonist carries out with the
intention to get oxygen to the upper section of the boat.
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FIGURE 2 | The four factors in the dilemma set, adapted from
Christensen and Gomila (2012), reproduced with permission. (1)
Personal Force: the kind of imaginary involvement with the situation:
Personal, as direct cause, or Impersonal, as an indirect agent in the
process of harm. (2) Benefit Recipient: concerns whether the
protagonist’s life is at stake (Self-Beneficial action), or not
(Other-Beneficial action). (3) Evitability : regards whether the victim would
die alongside the other individuals in the group if the moral transgression
is not carried out (Inevitable death, the person would die anyway), or not
(Avoidable death, the person would not die if no action is taken). (4)
Intentionality : if the action is carried out intentionally with the explicit
aim to kill the person as a means to save others, this is Instrumental
harm (it explicitly needs the death of that person to save the others). If
the innocent person dies as a non-desired side-effect of the action by
some independent mechanism and not directly by the action of the
protagonist, the harm is Accidental.
resulted in more coherence between what they said they would
do and what they actually did (Feldman Hall et al., 2012). In any
case, it is clear that consistency is required.
For the present dilemma set a direct question was used Do
you [action verb] so that. . . to emphasize the consequences of the
choice made by the agent. Scales (Likert, Visual Analogical. . . )
were used instead of a dichotomous answer format, as a way to
uncover the degree of conflict experienced.
SUMMARY: THE REVISED SET
The revised set consists of 46 dilemmas, of which 23 are Personal
and 23 are Impersonal. As can be observed in Table 1, we main-
tained the original dilemma numbers so that it is easy to compare
across sets. In 23 of the 46 dilemmas, the protagonist’s life is
in danger and the moral violation results in saving not only
a greater number of individuals, but also the protagonist her-
self (Self-Beneficial dilemmas), whereas in the remaining 23, the
protagonist’s life is not in danger (Other-Beneficial dilemmas).
In turn, there are 11 Personal and 11 Impersonal Self -Beneficial
dilemmas, and 12 Personal and 12 Impersonal Other-Beneficial
dilemmas.
There are 24 dilemmas where the death is Avoidable and 22
where it is Inevitable. Finally, there are 18 dilemma scenarios with
Accidental harm (7 Personal and 11 Impersonal; 10 Self-Beneficial
and 8 Other-Beneficial; 10 Avoidable and 8 Inevitable) and 28
with Instrumental harm (16 Personal and 12 Impersonal; 12 Self-
Beneficial and 16 Other-Beneficial; 14 Avoidable and 14 Inevitable).
See Table 1 for a summary. Please note that it was not possible
to provide the same number (quantity) of dilemmas in each of
the 16 categories because we relied on the materials of the former
set. Refer to our discussion of this matter in the Supplementary
Material (A) on limitations.
AROUSAL AND VALENCE NORMING EXPERIMENT
Peoples’ moral judgment has been shown to be sensitive to the
affective impact of a dilemma in the individual (Moretto et al.,
2010; Navarrete et al., 2012; Ugazio et al., 2012). However, no
dilemma set has so far been assessed in terms of the affec-
tive arousal the individual dilemmas elicit in normal population
as they are read—i.e., even if no moral judgment is required.
Therefore, data points for affective arousal and valence were
obtained for each dilemma of this set.
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Table 1 | Revised dilemmas.
Personal Impersonal
Self-beneficial Other-beneficial Self-beneficial Other-beneficial
Avoidable Inevitable Avoidable Inevitable Avoidable Inevitable Avoidable Inevitable
death death death death death death death death
1 13 25 37 2 14 26 38
3 15 27 39 4 16 28 40
5 17 29 41 6 18 30 42
7 19 31 43 8 20 32 44
9 (21) 33 45 10 (22) 34 46
11 23 35 47 12 24 36 48
The numbers refer to the dilemma number as given in the stimulus set (Supplementary Material). The colors refer to instrumental harm (gray) and accidental harm
(black). We have kept the numbers (dilemma numbers) as in Moore et al. (2008) to facilitate comparisons between the sets. Please note that there is not the same
number of dilemmas in each of the 16 categories. Please see our discussion of this matter in the section Arousal and Valence Norming Experiment on limitations.
The dilemmas 21 and 22 were removed (Cliffhanger dilemmas, see in the section Dilemma Design (1)—Formulation for reference).
We know that peoples’ moral judgments vary as a function
of the four conceptual factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient,
Evitability, and Intentionality. However, how peoples’ affective
responses (valence and arousal) are modulated by these fac-
tors remains to be established. Besides, because inter-individual
differences in emotional sensitivity and empathy can affect the
subjective experience of arousal, participants in this experiment
were assessed on these variables by means of self-report measures.
METHODS
Participants
Sixty-two undergraduate psychology students participated in this
study in exchange for a course credit in one of their degree sub-
jects (43 females, 19 males; age range = 18–48 years; m = 21.0,
SD = 5.35). Participants completed four self-report measures.
First, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983), which
has four scales that focus on perspective taking, tendency to iden-
tify with fictitious characters, emotional reactions to the negative
experiences of others, and empathic concern for others. Second,
theQuestionnaire of Emotional Empathy (Mehrabian and Epstein,
1972) that conceives empathy as the vicarious emotional response
to the perceived emotional experience of others. It explicitly
understands empathy as different from Theory of Mind (ToM)
and focuses on emotional empathy where high scores indicate a
high responsiveness to other peoples’ emotional reactions. Third,
the Questionnaire of Emotional Sensitivity (EIM) (Bachorowski
and Braaten, 1994), which refers to the intensity with which a per-
son experiences emotional states irrespectively of their affective
valence. Fourth, participants completed the Toronto Alexithymia
Scale (TAS) in which a high score means difficulties in under-
standing and describing emotional states with words (Taylor et al.,
1985). For results on the self-report measures, see Table 2. All
were native Spanish speakers.
Materials
The forty-six moral dilemmas were arranged to be presented in
random order in the stimulus presentation program DirectRT
(www.empirisoft.com) v. 2006.2.0.28. The experiment was set up
Table 2 | Participant characteristics in terms of emotional sensitivity,
empathy, and alexithymia.
Instrument Mean SD
EIM (Bachorowski and Braaten, 1994) 164.75 18.77757859
Emotional empathy (Mehrabian and
Epstein, 1972)
46.7 25.71703913
IRI (Davis, 1983) 55.7 8.095405686
TAS (Taylor et al., 1985) 18.3 14.78237613
to run on six PCs [Windows XP SP3 PC (Intel PentiumDual Core
E5400, 2.70GHz, 4GB RAM)] and stimuli were displayed on 19′′
screens (with a resolution of 1440 × 900 p; color: 32 bits; refresh
rate: 60Hz). Data were analyzed using the statistical package SPSS
v. 18 (www.ibm.com).
Procedure
Participants signed up for the experiment in class after having
completed the four self-report scales. The day of the experi-
ment, participants provided demographic data regarding gender,
age, and level of study. Informed consent was obtained from
each participant prior to participation in any of the tasks and
questionnaire procedures.
Participants were instructed as outlined in the section
Instructions to the Participant. Each dilemma was presented in
white Arial font, pt 16, on a black screen. By key press, the first
paragraph of the dilemma appeared. With the next key press,
the second paragraph appeared4. Participants read at their own
pace, advancing from one screen to the other by pressing the
space bar. With the third key press, the first two paragraphs of
the dilemma disappeared and two Likert scales appeared on sub-
sequent screens, the first asking participants to indicate their level
4Please note: in this arousal and valence norming procedure participants did
not see the question. This was to avoid confounds between the arousal and
valence judgments and a moral judgment.
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of arousal (1= not arousing at all; 7= very arousing) and the sec-
ond asking them to indicate the perceived valence of the dilemma
(1 = very negative; 7 = very positive). The ratings were made
by means of key press on the number keyboard of the computer.
Four practice dilemmas were added in the beginning of the task.
Data from these trials were discarded before data analysis.
The experiment was carried out in a laboratory of the uni-
versity suited for experiments with six individual PCs separated
in individual booths. Participants carried out the task in groups
of 1–6 people. Viewing distance was of approximately 16 inches
from the screen. The study was approved by the University’s
Ethics Committee (COBE280213_1388).
RESULTS
Factorial Repeated Measure (RM) 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 Analysis of
Variances (ANOVA) were computed on subjective arousal and
valence ratings (Likert scale data), and on the RT of the
arousal ratings. The factors were (1) Personal Force (Personal
vs. Impersonal harm); (2) Benefit Recipient (Self-Beneficial vs.
Other-Beneficial); (3) Evitability (Avoidable vs. Inevitable harm);
and (4) Intentionality (Accidental vs. Instrumental harm). As
effect sizes we report Pearson’s r, where 0.01 is considered a small
effect size, 0.3 a medium effect and 0.5 a large effect (Cohen,
1988).
To rule out any effect of Gender in the results, the above
ANOVA was computed with the between-subjects factor Gender.
There was no effect of gender in any of the interactions
with the four factors, neither in the arousal ratings: Personal
Force∗gender: F(1, 60) = 1.47; p = 0.230; Benefit Recipient∗gender:
F(1, 60) = 0.774; p = 0.383; Evitability: F(1, 60) = 0.079; p =
0.780; Intentionality∗gender: F(1, 60) = 0.101, p = 752; nor in
the valence ratings: Personal Force ∗ gender: F(1, 60) = 0.004;
p = 0.949; Benefit Recipient∗gender: F(1, 60) = 0.346; p = 0.558;
Evitability: F(1, 60) = 0.019; p = 0.890; Intentionality∗gender:
F(1, 60) = 0.184, p = 0.670, nor in the RT. Therefore, data of
female and male participants were aggregated.
Arousal
All 16 dilemma categories were rated as being felt as of moderate
to high arousal (range: m = 5.58–6.24; see Table 3). Two of the
four factors showed significant effects on the arousal ratings. First,
there was a significant main effect of Personal Force [F(1, 61) =
6.031; p = 0.017; r = 0.30], PMD being rated as more arousing
(m = 5.92; SD = 0.12), than IMD (m = 5.83; SD = 0.12). The
second main effect was of Benefit Recipient [F(1, 61) = 47.57; p <
0.001; r = 0.66], Self-Beneficial Dilemmas being rated as more
arousing (m = 6.02, SD = 0.12) than Other-Beneficial Dilemmas
(m = 5.70, SD = 0.13). See Figure S3. There were no significant
main effects of Evitability [F(1, 61) = 0.368; p = 0.546], nor of
Intentionality [F(1, 61) = 0.668; p = 0.417]. See Table S1 for the
means and Figure S3 in the Supplementary Material.
There was a significant interaction of Benefit
Recipient*Intentionality [F(1, 61) = 15.24; p < 0.001; r = 0.44].
This indicates that Intentionality had different effects on partic-
ipants’ ratings of arousal depending on whether the dilemma
was Self-Beneficial or Other-Beneficial. Figure S4 illustrates the
results. Paired t-tests showed that when Self-Beneficial Harm was
Table 3 | RM ANOVA of the RT of the arousal ratings.
RM ANOVA—Main effects on RT AROUSAL
(Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability, Intentionality)
Mean (ms) SE F-test p r
(1, 61)
PERSONAL FORCE
Personal (PMD) 2564.46 112.96
5.796 0.019 0.36
Impersonal (PMD) 2716.77 123.19
BENEFIT RECIPIENT
Self-beneficial 2506.66 119.52
20.783 <0.001 0.88
Other-beneficial 2774.57 115.66
EVITABILITY
Avoidable 2648.79 116.83
0.085 0.771 ns
Inevitable 2632.44 117.71
INTENTIONALITY
Accidental 2623.86 118.10
0.258 0.613 ns
Instrumental 2657.37 119.02
The values represent miliseconds.
Accidental the dilemma was rated as more arousing than when it
was Instrumental [t(61) = 3.690, p < 0.001, r = 0.43]. For Other-
Beneficial Harm, the pattern was reversed, as the Instrumental
Harm dilemmas were more arousing than the Accidental Harm
dilemmas [t(61) = −1.878, p = 0.065, trend effect, r = 0.05].
When comparing the Accidental and Instrumental Harm condi-
tions, we found that Self-Beneficial, Accidental Harm dilemmas
resulted in higher arousal ratings than when dilemmas were
Other-Beneficial [t(61) = 7.626, p < 0.001, r = 0.49]. The same
pattern emerged when the harm was Instrumental; it was
judged as more arousing when it was Self-Beneficial, than when
it was Other-Beneficial [t(61) = 3.494, p = 0.001, r = 0.17].
If correcting for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni
method, this would mean accepting a new significance level of
α = 0.05/4 → α∗ = 0.0125. This should be taken into account
when considering the result with the trend effect.
Valence
Descriptive statistics of the valence ratings confirmed that all 16
dilemma categories were rated as being of negative valence (range:
m = 1.71–2.23; see Table S1).
There were significant main effects of Personal Force [F(1, 61) =
28.00; p < 0.001; r = 0.57] and of Benefit Recipient [F(1, 61) =
31.509; p ≤ 0.001; r = 0.58]. PMD were rated as significantly
more negative (m = 1.905, SD = 0.065) than IMD (m = 2.054;
SD = 0.068). Likewise, Self -Beneficial Dilemmas were rated as
significantly more negative (m = 1.884, SD = 0.068) thanOther-
Beneficial Dilemmas (m = 2.075; SD = 0.067). The two other
factors did not show main effects [Evitability F(1, 61) = 1.201;
p = 0.277; and Intentionality F(1, 61) = 0.135; p = 0.715]. See
Table S1.
There were two significant interactions. The first was Personal
Force∗Intentionality [F(1, 61) = 7.695, p = 0.007; r = 0.33]. The
Figure S5 shows that Intentionality had different effects on
how people rated the valence of PMD and IMD. Paired t-tests
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showed that Accidental harm was rated as significantly more
negative than Instrumental harm in Impersonal Moral dilemmas
[t(61) = −2.297, p = 0.025, r = 0.08], while no such difference
was found betweenAccidental and Instrumental harm for Personal
Moral dilemmas [t(61) = 1.441, p = 0.155, r = 0.03]. See Figure
S5. If correcting for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni
method, this would mean accepting a new significance level of
α = 0.05/4 → α∗ = 0.0125. This should be taken into account
when considering the result of the first t-test (p = 0.025).
The second significant interaction was Benefit
Recipient∗Intentionality [F(1, 61) = 6.041, p = 0.017; r = 0.30].
This indicates that intention had different effects on the valence
ratings depending on whether the dilemma was Self - or Other-
Beneficial. Paired t-tests showed that for Self-BeneficialDilemmas,
harm was judged significantly more negative when it was
Accidental as compared to Instrumental harm [t(61) = −2.300,
p = 0.025, r = 0.08]. No such difference in valence ratings of
Accidental and Instrumental harm for Other-Beneficial dilemmas
[t(61) = 1.296, p = 0.200, r = 0.03]. See Figure S6. If correcting
for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni method, this
would mean accepting a new significance level of α = 0.05/4
→ α∗ = 0.0125. This should be taken into account when
considering the result of these t-tests (p = 0.017 and p = 0.025).
The assessment of valence was only carried out to confirm that
all dilemmas were of a strongly negative valence. This has hereby
been confirmed and no other analysis will be carried out involv-
ing this feature of the dilemmas. All values for both arousal and
valence are available for each dilemma in the excel spreadsheet
that accompanies this manuscript (Supplementary Material).
Reaction time
A RM ANOVA was carried out on the RT of the arousal rat-
ings with the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability,
and Intentionality. Main Effects were found for Personal Force and
Benefit Recipient, no interactions were significant. See Table 3.
Next, a regression analysis was conducted to ascertain how
much of the variance in the RT of the arousal ratings was
explained by the arousal ratings. This procedure was executed
for each of the 16 dilemma categories. Summary Table 4 shows
that except for four of the categories, the arousal ratings signif-
icantly explained between 6 and 38% of the variance in the RT.
Figure 3 shows how the overall correlation between the variables
indicates that the more arousing a dilemma was, the faster partic-
ipants indicated their rating. The correlation coefficient between
the mean arousal ratings and the mean RT of arousal ratings was,
p < 0.001; r = −0.434.
Inter-individual differences: emotional sensitivity and empathy
To ensure that the results of our arousal ratings were not driven
by inter-individual differences, participants had been assessed on
a series of emotion-related questionnaires. Of the four question-
naires, the level of empathy measured with the questionnaire by
Mehrabian and Epstein had a significant effect on arousal ratings
and on arousal rating RT. The overall correlation coefficients for
arousal ratings and Empathy scores was r = 0.289; p = 0.025 and
for arousal RT and empathy scores it was r = −0.325; p = 0.011.
The higher the empathy scores, the higher the arousal ratings
Table 4 | Summary table of the regression analysis of arousal ratings
as predictors of the arousal ratings’ RT for each of the 16 dilemma
categories.
Variables B SE B R2 B P
PMD_Self_Avo_Acc −773.62 176.50 0.243 −0.493 0.000
PMD_Self_Avo_Instr −336.08 134.03 0.095 −0.308 0.015
PMD_Self_Ine_Acc −181.10 144.65 0.025 −0.160 0.215 (ns)
PMD_Self_Ine_Instr −692.58 113.55 0.380 −0.619 0.000
PMD_Other_Avo_Acc −130.67 150.71 0.012 −0.111 0.389 (ns)
PMD_Other_Avo_Instr −231.73 143.76 0.042 −0.204 0.112 (ns)
PMD_Other_Ine_Acc −276.63 136.91 0.062 −0.252 0.048
PMD_Other_Ine_instr −495.32 140.80 0.171 −0.414 0.001
IMD_Self_Avo_Acc −348.19 129.55 0.107 −0.328 0.009
IMD_Self_Avo_Instr −582.35 126.31 0.261 −0.511 0.000
IMD_Self_Ine_Acc −572.35 153.15 0.189 −0.435 0.000
IMD_Self_Ine_Instr −382.88 174.58 0.074 −0.272 0.032
IMD_Other_Avo_Acc −516.66 154.98 0.156 −0.395 0.002
IMD_Other_Avo_Instr −486.55 150.54 0.148 −0.385 0.002
IMD_Other_Ine_Acc −140.19 180.26 0.010 −0.100 0.440 (ns)
IMD_Other_Ine_Instr −339.32 146.90 0.082 −0.286 0.024
Abbreviations → IMD, Impersonal Moral Dilemmas; PMD, Personal Moral dilem-
mas; Self, Self-Beneficial; Other, Other-Beneficial; Avo, Avoidable; Ine, Inevitable;
Acc, Accidental; Instr, Instrumental.
to the dilemmas in general, and the shorter the RT (negative
correlation coefficient).
SUMMARY: AROUSAL AND VALENCE NORMING EXPERIMENT
For a dilemma to be very negatively arousing (i.e., ratings very
negative in valence and high in arousal), the proposed moral
transgression had to be described as up-close and Personal.
Besides, dilemmas where the protagonist’s own life was at stake
were perceived as more negatively arousing than those dilemmas
where other peoples’ lives were at stake. In particular, if the death
of the innocent victim happened accidentally as a non-desired side-
effect, the dilemma was perceived as more negatively arousing,
specifically, if the protagonist’s life was at stake, than if the acci-
dental death of the victim happened in the intent to save other
people. In detail:
Affective arousal and valence
- there were significant main effects of the factors Personal
Force and Benefit Recipient both for arousal and valence rat-
ings: Personal and Self-Beneficial dilemmas were perceived as
more arousing and more negative than Impersonal and Other-
Beneficial dilemmas, respectively;
- there were significant interactions between the two above
factors and the factor Intentionality. Intentionality influences
perceived arousal in such way that Self-Beneficial dilemmas
(as compared to Other-Beneficial dilemmas) were rated as
more arousing when harm happened as a non-desired side-
effect (Accidental harm), while Instrumental harm (harm used
as a means) was equally arousing in both Self - and Other-
Beneficial dilemmas. Furthermore, when harm was Personal
(up-close and corporal), as compared to Impersonal (distant
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FIGURE 3 | Correlation between Arousal ratings and the RT. Color
coding: Personal Moral Dilemmas (PMD; Blue/Red, circles); Impersonal
Moral Dilemmas (IMD; Green/Yellow, squares). Arousal ratings are 1 = Not
arousing, calm; 7 = Very arousing, on the x-axis. RT is in milliseconds (ms)
on the y-axis. The numbers refer to the dilemma numbers in the
dilemma set.
and abstract), and used as a means (Instrumental harm),
dilemmas were rated as more negative, than if harm was
Impersonal. Conversely, participants found Accidental harm
equally negative when it was Personal (up-close and corporal)
and Impersonal (distant and abstract).
Reaction time
RT to a moral judgment task has previously been suggested
as an indicator of emotional involvement. The more arousing
a dilemma was, the faster participants were in making their
rating.
Inter-individual differences
There was a correlation between inter-individual differences in
empathy assessed by means of the Questionnaire of Emotional
Empathy (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972) and the arousal rat-
ings. It showed that the higher the levels of empathy, the more
arousing were the dilemmas to the participant. This makes sense
because this instrument describes sensitivity to others’ emotional
states. It specifically conceives empathy as the vicarious emo-
tional response to the perceived emotional experience of others
and understands empathy as different from ToM and perspective-
taking, and focuses on emotional empathy where high scores
indicate a high responsiveness to other peoples’ emotional reac-
tions. However, apart from this correlation between arousal rat-
ings and empathy level, no other individual differences had an
effect on perceived arousal (the other variables we assessed were
gender, IRI, emotional sensitivity, alexithymia).We therefore con-
clude that—at least in this sample of Spanish Undergraduates-
the arousal ratings of this dilemma set are rather robust across
individual differences.
DISCUSSION OF AROUSAL AND VALENCE NORMING EXPERIMENT
While all dilemmas are rated similarly as negative in valence, sig-
nificant differences were found in how they were rated in terms of
felt arousal. This means, first, that at least part of the emotional
involvement inmoral judgment of the dilemmas can be due to the
arousal triggered when reading the situational description. And
second, results showed that differences in arousal are due to how
the different conceptual factors are manipulated. Thus, Personal
Force and Self-Beneficial dilemmas give rise to higher arousal rat-
ings than Impersonal and Other-Beneficial ones. Prima facie this
suggests that arousal has something to do with identification of
the experimental participant with the perspective of the main
character in the dilemmatic situation: it’s when one feels more
directly involved in the conflict, because of the action to be carried
out or the consequences for oneself that the action will have, that
one feels more aroused—even without having to make a judg-
ment. However, this prima facie interpretion is too simplistic, for
three reasons.
In the first place, it is clear that Personal Force dilemmas high-
light the personal involvement in physically producing the harm.
Similarly, Self-Beneficial dilemmas give rise to higher arousal rat-
ings only when the harm produced is Accidental, rather than
Instrumental. The latter case is one of self-interest: we experience
less conflict when what’s to be done is for our own benefit. Yet,
it becomes difficult when a benefit cannot be produced without
collateral damage. Third, whereas Self-Beneficial dilemmas take
longer to be rated (than Other-Beneficial), Personal Force ones
are rated faster than Impersonal ones. Jointly, these results sug-
gest that arousal ratings can have several etiologies, and therefore
cannot be interpreted simply as indication of degree of imaginary
involvement with the situation or as a measure of experienced
conflict. Both these causes need to be considered.
DILEMMA VALIDATION STUDY—MORAL JUDGMENT
EXPERIMENT
To validate this moral dilemma set, a moral judgment task was set
up to confirm the 4-factor structure in the dilemmas; i.e., the four
conceptual factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability,
and Intentionality.
Furthermore, to explore how the intentionality factor is under-
stood by participants, two versions of the dilemma set were
prepared: one version remained as has been described so far, while
in the other the question eliciting themoral judgment included an
“accidental harm specification” in the accidental harm dilemmas.
For instance, in the dilemma Burning Building, the question isDo
you put out the fire by activating the emergency system, which will
leave the injured without air, so you and the five other people can
escape? The sentence which will leave the injured without air is the
accidental harm specification. This makes it clear to the reader the
consequences of the proposed action. The analysis of this variable
is included here, but in future researchers can choose to leave the
accidental harm specification out of the question.
Additional analyses include (i) the analysis by Greene et al.
(2001, 2004) that gave rise to the Dual Process Hypothesis of
Moral Judgment (DPHMJ), (ii) an additional analysis of the
Intentionality factor, and (iii) an analyses of how interindividual
differences influence moral judgment.
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METHODS
Participants
Forty-three undergraduate psychology and educational science
students participated in this study in exchange for a course credit
in one of their degree subjects (30 females and 13 males; age
range = 18–54 years; m = 20.65, SD = 5.52). None of them
had seen the dilemmas before. See Table 5 for participant char-
acteristics including self-report measures of (i) the IRI (Davis,
1983), (ii) the Questionnaire of Emotional Empathy (Mehrabian
and Epstein, 1972), (iii) the Questionnaire of Emotional sensitiv-
ity (EIM) (Bachorowski and Braaten, 1994), (iv) the TAS (Taylor
et al., 1985), (v) the personality questionnaire Big Five (McCrae
and Costa, 1999), and (vi) the Thinking Style Questionnaire,Need
For Cognition Scale (NFC) (Cacioppo et al., 1984). All participants
were native Spanish speakers.
Materials
Forty-six standard moral dilemmas and four practice dilemmas
were presented in random order with the stimulus presentation
program DirectRT (www.empirisoft.com) v. 2006.2.0.28. The
experiment was set up to run on six PCs (Windows XP SP3 PC
(Intel PentiumDual Core E5400, 2.70 GHz, 4GB RAM) and stim-
uli were displayed on 19′′ screens (with a resolution of 1440 × 900
p; color: 32 bits; refresh rate: 60Hz).
Procedure
As in the previous experiment described in the section Arousal
and Valence Norming Experiment. Additionally: after the sec-
ond screen, the first two screens disappeared and the question
appeared. The question eliciting the moral judgment was “Do
you [action verb] so that. . . .” A 7-point Likert scale was displayed
below the question with the labels “No, I don’t do it” under the
number “1” and “Yes, I do it” under the number “7.” Half of the
participants (22 participants) saw the question “Do you [action
verb] so that. . . ,” while the other half (21 participants) saw a ques-
tion that furthermore involved the Accidental harm specification
in the case of the Accidental harm dilemmas, such as in: “do you
[action verb] which will [mechanism that will lead to the death] so
that. . . ” (Type of Question). The ratings were made by means of
key press on the using the number keys of the keyboard (top row
Table 5 | Participant characteristics.
Instrument Factors Mean SD
EIM (Bachorowski and Braaten,
1994)
165 18.53
Emotional empathy (Mehrabian
and Epstein, 1972)
48.58 23.41
IRI (Davis, 1983) 54.60 6.99
TAS (Taylor et al., 1985) 16.58 12.88
Big Five (McCrae and Costa,
1999)
Neuroticism 12.30 11.65
Extraversion 21.58 9.70
Openness to
experience
15.81 10.76
Agreeableness 13.72 9.84
Consciencousness 22.58 12.63
NFC (Cacioppo et al., 1984) 17.44 18.84
of numbers) of the computer. Four practice dilemmas were added
in the beginning of the task. Data from these trials were discarded
before data analysis. The study was approved by the University’s
Ethics Committee (COBE280213_1388).
RESULTS
A factorial RM 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was computed with
the Within-Subject factors Personal Force (PMD vs. IMD),
Benefit Recipient (Self-Beneficial vs. Other Beneficial), Evitability
(Avoidable vs. Inevitable harm), and Intentionality (Accidental
vs. Instrumental harm). Question Type (with vs. without the
Accidental harm specification) was the Between-Subject factor.
As effect sizes we report Pearson’s r, where 0.01 is considered
a small effect size, 0.3 a medium effect and 0.5 a large effect
(Cohen, 1988).
Subjective ratings: moral judgment
There was no significant main effect of the between-group
factor Type of Question (with or without accidental harm
specification) [F(1, 41) = 0.164, p = 0.688] and there were
no significant interactions between the Between-Subjects fac-
tor Type of Question and the four within-subject factors:
Personal Force∗Question Type [F(1, 41) = 0.09; p = 0.766; ns];
Benefit Recipient∗Question Type [F(1, 41) = 0.296; p = 0.589;
ns]; Evitability∗Question Type [F(1, 41) = 0.010; p = 0.921; ns];
Intentionality∗Question Type [F(1, 41) = 0.013; p = 0.911; ns].
This means that the two question formats (with and without the
Accidental harm specification) are equivalent and do not affect the
moral judgment a person makes. This means that the accidental-
ity of the harm is understood from the narrative without the need
to explicitly state it to the individual. Thus, data was aggregated
for subsequent analyses.
There were significant main effects of all four Within-Subject
factors: Personal Force [F(1, 41) = 54.97; p < 0.001; r = 0.75];
Benefit Recipient [F(1, 41) = 4.347; p = 0.043; r = 0.31];
Evitability [F(1, 41) = 69.984; p < 0.001; r = 0.79]; and
Intentionality [F(1, 41) = 12.971; p = 0.001; r = 0.49].
Participants were less likely to commit harm in PMD (m = 4.069;
SD = 0.124) than in IMD (m = 4.717; SD = 0.113) and they
were more likely to commit a moral transgression to save them-
selves (m = 4.508; SD = 0.103), than to save others (m = 4.278;
SD = 0.111). When the suggested harm was Inevitable, people
were more likely to commit it (m = 4.633; SD = 0.124) than
when harm was Avoidable (m = 4.152; SD = 0.103). Finally,
when the death of the victim was Accidental, participants were
more likely to commit the moral transgression (m = 4.549;
SD = 0.125) than when it was Instrumental (m = 4.236;
SD = 0.112). See Figures S7A–D.
Five of the six possible two-way interactions between the
four factors were significant. See Table 6 for a summary of the
means and interaction coefficients. Table 7 shows the t-tests to
break down the interactions. Figure S8 summarizes the interac-
tions graphically. If correcting for multiple comparisons using
the Bonferroni method, this would mean accepting a new signifi-
cance level of α = 0.05/4 → α∗ = 0.0125 for breaking down each
interaction. This should be taken into account when considering
the result of the t-test in Table 7D (Self-Beneficial Accidental vs.
Instrumental harm; p = 0.022).
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Table 6 | Summary table of the interactions (dependent variable: moral judgment, Likert scale rating; range: 1;7).
Factors Descriptives Interaction coefficients
Interactions Factor 1 Factor 2 Mean SD F (1, 41) p r
Personal Force * Beneficiency Personal Self 4.076 0.142
18.248 <0.001 0.55
Other 4.061 0.129
Impersonal Self 4.939 0.139
Other 4.494 0.119
Personal Force * Evitability Personal Avoidable 3.890 0.110
8.864 0.008 0.42
Inevitable 4.248 0.147
Impersonal Avoidable 4.415 0.112
Inevitable 5.018 0.123
Personal Force * Intention Personal Accidental 4.326 0.141
14.582 <0.001 0.51
Instrumental 3.812 0.131
Impersonal Accidental 4.773 0.129
Instrumental 4.660 0.114
Beneficiency * Evitability Self Avoidable 4.222 0.135
1.663 0.204 ns
Inevitable 4.793 0.146
Other Avoidable 4.082 0.110
Inevitable 4.474 0.132
Beneficiency * Intention Self Accidental 4.416 0.137
40.202 <0.001 0.70
Instrumental 4.599 0.140
Other Accidental 4.683 0.146
Instrumental 3.872 0.118
Evitability * Intention Avoidable Accidental 4.410 0.112
12.990 <0.001 0.49
Instrumental 3.894 0.112
Inevitable Accidental 4.689 0.151
Instrumental 4.577 0.121
First, the Benefit Recipient variable had a differential effect on
the moral judgment for PMD and IMD (Figure S8A). Participants
were more likely to commit harm if the harm was carried
out to safe themselves (Self -Beneficial, as compared to Other-
Beneficial), however, only if the dilemma was Impersonal. If harm
was Personal, participants were equally likely to commit the harm
both when it was Self - or Other-Beneficial.
Second, also the Evitability variable had a differential effect on
the moral judgment for PMD and IMD (Figure S8B). Participants
made more deontological responses for PMD in general; how-
ever, they were more likely to commit harm when the death of
the innocent person was Inevitable (as compared to Avoidable).
Third, also the Intentionality variable affected how partici-
pants judged PMD and IMD (Figure S8C). Again participants
were overall more likely to make a deontological moral judgment
in PMD than in IMD, however, participants were less likely to
commit the moral transgression when harm was Instrumental (as
compared to Accidental), but specifically only in the case of PMD.
Fourth, the Intentionality variable affected how participants
judged Self - and Other-Beneficial dilemmas (Figure S8D). If the
proposed harm was Instrumental, participants were less likely
to commit it when the dilemma involved harm toward Others
(as compared to harm toward the participant herself), while for
accidental harm, participants were less likely to commit harm if it
was accidental to save herself, than if it was to save others.
Fifth, Intentionality also affected how participants judged
Avoidable and Inevitable dilemmas (Evitability factor), (Figure
S8E). When harm was Avoidable (as compared to Inevitable), par-
ticipants were less likely to commit it when the harm described
in the dilemma was Instrumental than when it was Accidental.
However, participants were equally likely to commit harm to
both Accidental and Instrumental harm dilemmas when the harm
described in the dilemma was Inevitable.
That there was no interaction between Benefit Recipient and
Evitability means that participants were equally likely to commit
harm, irrespective of whether death was Avoidable or Inevitable
for Self- or Other-Beneficial dilemmas.
Reaction time
There was one significant main effect [Intentionality: F(1, 41) =
13.252; p = 0.001; r = 0.49] and one significant interaction
[Intentionality∗Question Type: F(1, 41) = 13.629; p = 0.001; r =
0.50]. Participants in general needed longer to make moral judg-
ments about actions involving Accidental harm (m = 5803.223;
SD = 424.081) than of actions involving Instrumental harm
(m = 5185.185; SD = 394.389). The interaction indicates that
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Table 7 | Follow-up t-tests to break down the interactions in the
moral judgment task.
Mean SE t-test(42) p r
(A) Tests to break down the interaction Personal Force*Benefit
Recipient
PERSONAL MORAL DILEMMAS
Self-
beneficient
4.076 0.142
0.134 0.894 ns
Other-
beneficient
4.061 0.129
IMPERSONAL MORAL DILEMMAS
Self-
beneficient
4.939 0.139
3.535 0.001 0.48
Other-
beneficient
4.494 0.119
(B) Tests to break down the interaction Personal Force*Evitability
PERSONAL MORAL DILEMMAS
Avoidable 3.890 0.110 −4.742 <0.001 0.59
Inevitable 4.248 0.147
IMPERSONAL MORAL DILEMMAS
Avoidable 4.415 0.112 −9.159 <0.001 0.82
Inevitable 5.018 0.123
(C) Tests to break down the interaction Personal Force*Intentionality
PERSONAL MORAL DILEMMAS
Accidental 4.326 0.141
4.681 <0.001 0.59
Instrumental 3.812 0.131
IMPERSONAL MORAL DILEMMAS
Accidental 4.773 0.129
1.265 0.213 ns
Instrumental 4.660 0.114
(D) Tests to break down the interaction Benefit Recipient*
Intentionality
SELF-BENEFICAL DILEMMAS
Accidental 4.416 0.137 −2.397 0.021 0.35
Instrumental 4.610 0.140
OTHER-BENEFICAL DILEMMAS
Accidental 4.683 0.146
5.605 <0.001 0.65
Instrumental 3.872 0.118
(E) Tests to break down the interaction Evitability*Intentionality
AVOIDABLE HARM
Accidental 4.411 0.112
5.853 <0.001 0.67
Instrumental 3.894 0.112
INEVITABLE HARM
Accidental 4.689 0.151
0.977 0.334 ns
Instrumental 4.578 0.121
Intentionality had a differential effect on RT depending on
the Question Type. The group that had the question with
the Accidental harm specification, needed significantly longer
to respond to Accidental harm (m = 6356.081; SD = 578.441)
than the group without such specification (m = 5250.365; SD =
620.309). No such difference appeared between the groups
for Instrumental harm (m = 5112.582; SD = 537.941 and m =
5259.065; SD = 576.878, respectively).
Due to the fact that the only main effect and interactions that
appear significant in the analysis of the RT data is the factor
that regards the Between-Subject variable Type of Question, this
effect was explored more closely. Therefore, the RM ANOVA was
computed again, first with the participants in the With condition
and afterwards with the participants in the Without condition.
Again the factor Intentionality was significant in the With con-
dition [F(1, 22) = 21.208; p < 0.001; r = 0.70], but not in the
Without condition [F(1, 19) = 0.002; p = 0.964]. Hence, the effect
was merely driven by the higher number of words in the questions
in theWith condition.
To ensure that RT was not conditioned by the word count of
the questions in general, a regression was computed with word
count in the question as a predictor and RT as the dependent
variable. No significant relationship was found (B = −27.695;
BSD = 30.711; β = −0.234; p = 0.382). Hence, the word count
of the questions did not influence the RT of participants except
in this particular case of the Intentionality factor. Apart from this
problematic effect, there were no other significant main effects or
interactions.
As much research in the field of moral judgment with moral
dilemmas suggests a relation between the type of moral judg-
ment (deontological vs. utilitarian) and RT, this matter was
explored further. First, a curvilinear regression was computed
with Moral Judgment as predictor and the RT as dependent vari-
able. The resulting model was significant [F(1, 41) = 11.015; p <
0.001; r = 0.46] and moral judgment accounted for 33.9% of the
variance in the RT. Both for very deontological (Likert ratings
toward 1) and very utilitarian moral judgments (Likert ratings
toward 7) participants were faster than when making a more
intermediate moral judgment (Likert ratings around 4). See the
illustration of the relation between moral judgment and RT in
Figure 4.
To assess RT as a function of the response given (deontolog-
ical vs. utilitarian in absolute terms, not in a scale from 1 to 7
as presented above) as in Greene et al. (2001, 2004), the Moral
Judgment values of the 7-point Likert scale were dichotomized.
Judgments of values between 1 and 3 were considered “deonto-
logical,” and values between 5 and 7 were considered “utilitarian.”
Values of 4 were discarded. Mean RT was calculated as a func-
tion of this re-coding. Subsequently, the ANOVA from Greene
et al. (2001, 2004) 2 × 2 (Response Type and Personal Force) was
carried out. No significant main effects were found [Response
Type: F(1, 42) = 0.402; p = 0.529; Personal Force: F(1, 42) = 0.197;
p = 0.659].
In previous analyses, the factor Intentionality has been
shown to be of key relevance in moral judgment. Therefore,
another 2 × 2 ANOVA with the variables Response Type and
Intentionality was run. There was a significant main effect
of Intentionality (p = 0.015) and a significant interaction
of Response Type∗Intentionality (p = 0.018), see Table 8 and
Figure S9. Breaking down the interaction it was shown that
participants took longer to make a deontological moral
judgment when harm was then produced accidentally,
than if it was instrumental (p = 0.003). No such difference
was found for utilitarian moral judgments (p = 0.681), see
Figure S9.
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FIGURE 4 | Curvilinar relationship between Moral Judgment and RT.
Color coding: Personal Moral Dilemmas (Blue/Red, circles); Impersonal
Moral Dilemmas (Green/Yellow, squares). Mean Likert scale responses: 1 =
No, I don’t do it, i.e., deontological moral judgment; 7 = Yes, I do it, i.e.,
utilitarian moral judgment. RT is in milliseconds (ms). PMD, Personal Moral
Dilemmas; IMD, Impersonal Moral Dilemmas.
Inter-individual differences: gender
There was a significant interaction between the factor Benefit
Recipient and the participants’ gender [F(1, 61) = 10.079; p =
0.003; r = 0.37]; male participants were more ready to commit
a harm in the case of Self -Beneficial dilemmas (m = 5.137; SD =
0.215), than female participants (m = 4.235; SD = 0.142). In the
Other-Beneficial dilemma category, no such gender differences
were found (males: m = 4.439; SD = 0.203; females: m = 4.208;
SD = 0.133). This effect is reported for the sake of completeness
of the scientific record. However, first, we did not specifically con-
template this effect, so we did not have equal numbers of male and
female participants. Second, we do not aim to make any assump-
tions about gender differences based on such preliminary data.
There is no sound scientific evidence that supports why there
should be gender differences in moral judgment, nor of what kind
these may be, nor what should be the evolutionary basis for them.
This is a sensitive issue that deserves thorough investigation that
goes far beyond the scope of this paper. Therefore, we assume that
there are no genuine gender differences inmoral judgment in par-
ticipants of one same culture and have chosen to analyze the data
of female and male participants together.
Two other studies have reported an effect of gender in their
data (Fumagalli et al., 2009, 2010). However, the dilemma set
used in these studies was the originally used by Greene et al.
(2001, 2004) which has important methodological shortcomings
(as pointed out by this paper; for a review see Christensen and
Gomila, 2012), which is why ideally such claims on gender dif-
ferences should really not be made. For such claims to be based
on solid grounds a study should be designed controlling variables
of empathy and other personality factors between genders, and of
course, have an equal sample size of each gender.
Table 8 | Main Effects and Interactions of the RM ANOVA Question
Type*Intentionality.
(A) RM ANOVA—Main effects on RT MORAL JUDGMENT as a
function of RESPONSE TYPE
Mean SE F (1, 41) p r
QUESTION TYPE
Deontological response 5680.779 427.726
0.005 0.946 ns
Utilitarian response 5661.827 441.793
INTENTIONALITY
Accidental harm 6009.467 449.472
6.499 0.015 0.37
Instrumental harm 5333.139 415.105
INTERACTIONS
Response Type*Intentionality 6.010 0.018 0.65
(B) Tests to break down the interaction
Mean SE t-test(42) p r
DEONTOLOGICAL RESPONSE
Accidental harm 6434.148 571.955
3.313 0.003 0.46
Instrumental harm 4927.411 393.270
UTILITARIAN RESPONSE
Accidental harm 5584.787 424.480 −0.414 0.681 ns
Instrumental harm 5738.867 528.586
Mean Likert scale responses: 1 = No, I don’t do it, i.e., deontological moral judg-
ment; 7 = Yes, I do it, i.e., utilitarian moral judgment. RT is in milliseconds (ms).
Inter-individual differences: thinking style, personality traits,
emotional sensitivity
To test the influence of inter-individual differences on moral
judgment a regression was computed with all of the scores of
the questionnaires assessing inter-individual differences in the
model predicting the mean moral judgment of the participants.
As shown in Table S2, the resulting regression model was signif-
icant [F(10) = 2.954; p = 0.011; r = 0.47] and explained 50.5%
of the variance in the moral judgments. However, only three of
the 10 predictor variables were significant: Emotional Sensitivity
(p = 0.018), and two of the Big Five factors, Agreeableness (p =
0.046) and Conscientiousness (p = 0.001). The higher the scores
in the EIM, the more deontological were the moral judgments
(participants with higher scores in the EIM were less susceptible
to commit the proposed harm). For the two factors of the Big Five,
the pattern was reverse: the higher the scores, the more utilitar-
ian were the judgments (participants with higher scores in these
two dimensions were more likely to commit the proposed harm).
However, considering the Beta coefficient, it can be observed that
these effects were—although existent—rather small.
AROUSAL AND MORAL JUDGMENT
In order to determine whether the levels of arousal of the dilem-
mas rated by one group of participants, would be related to the
moral judgments of a different group of participants, the dataset
was transposed and dilemmas treated as cases. A simple regres-
sion was conducted with the arousal ratings as predictor variable
and the moral judgments as dependent variable. The resulting
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model was significant [F(1, 44) = 22.613; p < 0.001; r = 0.58],
showing that the level of arousal of a dilemma predicted 33.9%
of the variance in the moral judgment variable. Figure 5 shows
that the more arousing a dilemma was, the more likely partici-
pants were to refrain from action (i.e., not committing the moral
transgression). See Table S3 for the model parameters.
SUMMARY: MORAL JUDGMENT EXPERIMENT
With this fine-tuned set of moral dilemmas it was confirmed that
the four factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability, and
Intentionality determined participants’ moral judgment:
First, participants tended to exhibit a deontological response
style (i.e., they refrained from committing harm) when harm
was described as Personal (as compared to Impersonal), Other-
Beneficial (as compared to Self -Beneficial), Avoidable (as
compared to Inevitable), and Instrumental (as compared to
Accidental). In other words, when harm was abstract and spatially
and intentionally separated from the agent, participants were
more likely to commit this moral transgression than if the harm
was described as up-close and gave an impression of “bloody
hands.”
Second, participants more readily sacrificed the life of another
person if their own life was at stake than if themoral transgression
would merely save other people. Besides, if harm to the victim
would have happened anyway, irrespective of whether the moral
transgression was carried out by the agent or not (as in “or one
person of 5 is killed or they all die”), participants were more likely
to incur in the moral transgression.
Third, participants more readily committed harm if harm hap-
pened as a non-desired side-effect of the action of the agent, it was
FIGURE 5 | Relationship between level of arousal of a dilemma and the
moral judgment made to that dilemma. Color/shape coding: Personal
Moral Dilemmas (Blue/Red, circles); Impersonal Moral Dilemmas
(Green/Yellow, squares). Mean Likert scale responses: 1 = No, I don’t do
it, i.e., deontological moral judgment; 7 = Yes, I do it, i.e., utilitarian moral
judgment. Mean Arousal scale responses: 1 = Not arousing, calm; 7 = Very
arousing.
more readily committed by the participants than if the proposed
harm would result in using the death of the victim as a means to
salvation of the others.
As regards the interactions between the factors:
First, the interaction between Personal Force and Benefit
Recipient indicated that participants were equally likely to commit
a moral transgression when the proposed harm involved “bloody
hands,” both when the harm would result in salvation of oneself
or of others. However, when the proposed harmful action was
abstract and distant, participants made a difference in their moral
judgment, depending on whether the salvation regarded them-
selves or others. Abstract harm commission made a utilitarian
response more likely when it was executed to save themselves.
Second, the interaction between Personal Force and
Intentionality indicated that harm that happened as a non-
desired side-effect of the moral transgression was consented
equally in IMD, both when harm was accidental and when it was
instrumental. However, in PMD, if harm was used as a means
(instrumentally), this made participants’ moral judgments more
deontological than when harm was accidental.
Third, the interaction between Benefit Recipient and
Intentionality indicated that for Self-Beneficient Dilemmas,
when harm happened as a non-desired side-effect of the pro-
posed action, participants were less likely to commit the moral
transgression, than when it was instrumental. Conversely, when
the harm would benefit others, the pattern was reverse: more
deontological moral judgments when harm was instrumental,
than when it was accidental.
Fourth, the interaction between Personal Force and Evitability
indicates that for both IMD and PMD, avoidable harm resulted in
more deontological moral judgments than did inevitable harm.
Fifth, the interaction between Evitability and Intentionality
indicates that both when harm to the victim could have been
avoided, harm as a side-effect was more readily consented, than
was the use of harm as a means. For inevitable harm no such dif-
ference between accidental and instrumental harm commission
was found.
Furthermore, we found that the more arousing a dilemma
was, the more likely it was that participants would choose a
deontological response style.
Finally, there was no main effect of Type of Response found by
Greene et al. (2001, 2004), indicating that with this optimized
dilemma set deontological responding is not faster than utilitar-
ian responding. Neither was there an interaction between Type
of Response∗Personal Force. However, with an additional ANOVA
with the factors Type of Response and Intentionality it was shown
that there was a significant main effect of Intentionality. Yet, more
importantly, there was an interaction between Type of Response
and Intentionality. This indicates that for dilemmas people were
judging deontologically, it took them particularly long to make
that judgment in the case when the proposed harm would result
in accidental harm to the victim.
DISCUSSION OF THE MORAL JUDGMENT EXPERIMENT
Summing up, results here show that that we are more prone
to behave for our benefit, if the harm will take place in any
case and producing the harm is not very demanding. Conversely,
we are going to experience a conflict—indexed by a longer
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response—when we are forced to do the harm ourselves, or to
do harm as collateral damage to benefit others. Moral principles
can be broken but only in well-justified situations (when con-
sequences are “big enough”). It’s not that we are deontological
or utilitarian thinkers, we are neither: moral judgments are bet-
ter viewed from the point of view of casuistics, the particularist
approach tomorals that takes the details of each case into account.
Any small detail maymatter to ourmoral judgment. Results show,
in any case, that rules are not applied algorithmically or in a strict
order (Hauser, 2006).
OVERALL DISCUSSION
Apart from providing normative values of valence, arousal, moral
judgment and RT for 46 moral dilemmas5 , the results of this
dilemma validation study challenge the DPHMJ proposed by
Greene et al. (2001, 2004). According to this hypothesis, deon-
tological moral judgments (refraining from harm) are fast and
emotion-based, while utilitarian moral judgments (deciding to
commit the harm) are slow as a result of deliberate reason-
ing processes. The assumptions of the DPHMJ were based on
a reaction time finding where an interaction between the Type
of Response given (deontological vs. utilitarian) and the Personal
Force (Personal vs. Impersonal) showed that when harm was
consented in a Personal Moral Dilemma (utilitarian response),
RT was significantly longer than when harm was not consented
(deontological response). No such difference in the response time
was found for Impersonal Moral Dilemmas. However, in our
study, while we also found that higher arousal correlates with
deontological judgment (in line with Moretto et al., 2010), we
failed to find the relationship with RT: both deontological and
utilitarian decisions can be made equally fast, and both to per-
sonal and impersonal dilemmas, depending on the other factors
involved. To put it another way, a fast judgment takes place when,
either a deontological reason guides the judgment, or when utili-
tarian considerations clearly dominate. Therefore, while we agree
that the dilemmas that take longer are those where the experi-
enced conflict is greater, conflict, however, has a more complex
etiology. In particular, judgment takes longer when people are
torn between utilitarian considerations of the greater good (sav-
ing many), and the suffering produced in others as an accidental
side-effect. An increased RT is likely to have been caused by rea-
soning processes in order to explore a way to avoid the conflict, in
either case.
As a matter of fact, the DPHMJ’s central result concerning
personal vs. impersonal dilemmas has already been challenged.
McGuire et al. (2009) reanalyzed the data sets from Greene and
colleagues and removed what they called “poorly endorsed items”
(those dilemmas not designed carefully enough). After this pro-
cedure by McGuire et al., the key effect disappeared from the data
(McGuire et al., 2009). Similarly, Ugazio et al. (2012), on their
part, showed that both deontological and utilitarian responding
could actually be triggered by different emotions with different
motivational tendencies. In their study, disgust induction (an
emotion that triggers withdrawal tendencies) resulted in more
5Supplementary Material accompanies this manuscript with all data points
presented in this work.
deontological moral judgments (i.e., refraining from harm), while
anger induction (an emotion that triggers approach tendencies)
resulted in more utilitarian moral judgments (i.e., committing
harm). This finding doesn’t fit the Dual Process account either,
because the study shows how different emotional phenomena
trigger both deontological and utilitarian moral judgment ten-
dencies.
Therefore, we propose that a potentially more suitable account
of moral judgment is one that gives a different role to emotions
in moral judgment, specifically, to the importance of the arousal
response which is triggered in the individual by the dilemmatic
situation along the way suggested by the Affect Infusion Model
(AIM) by Forgas (1995). This model posits that (i) arousal prop-
erties of the situation, (i) the motivational features of the emo-
tions triggered by it, and (iii) the associated cognitive appraisal
mechanisms, all play a crucial role in every judgment. This model
also posits that affect infusion is a matter of degree: any judg-
ment is also dependent on previous knowledge of the individual
about the event or situation he or she is about to judge; this
implies that it is dependent on deliberate reasoning as well as on
the magnitude of the emotional arousal triggered by the event or
situation.
See the Supplementary Material for a summary of limitations
of the method.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we have followed Hauser et al. view of moral dilem-
mas: “. . . the use of artificial moral dilemmas to explore our moral
psychology is like the use of theoretical or statistical models with
different parameters; parameters can be added or subtracted in
order to determine which parameters contribute most signifi-
cantly to the output” (Hauser et al., 2007). We have tried to
control for the variables known to influence moral judgment, in
order to find out which ones matter most, and how they interact.
One main result of this work is that, when dilemmas are
validated, Greene’s main effect of personal dilemmas partly dis-
appears, for a more complex pattern, which casts doubt on the
view that some moral judgments are the result of a deliberation,
while others, the deontological ones, are reached emotionally.
While higher arousal is related to deontological judgments, it is
not true that deontological judgments are faster than utilitarian
ones. Deontological judgments may take longer than utilitarian
ones if, after taking time to weight the options, and to look for
a way to minimize the transgression, one cannot find a way to
choose not to violate one’s principles.
Research with moral dilemmas holds fascinating possibilities
to study the grounding psychological principles of human moral
cognition. Contrary to the criticisms brought up against this
methodology, and in line with an increasing number of other
researchers, we believe that it is specifically the artificial nature
of moral dilemmas that make this methodology so valuable. In
any case, the scenarios described to us in moral dilemmas are
not more artificial than the stories narrated in novels and movies
where life-and death-decisions change the course of supposedly
inevitable events. Besides, other abundant channels of informa-
tion of that kind are the news on TV, radio, in the papers, and on
the internet. They inform us of atrocities that happened around
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the corner of our house while we were sleeping, or of heartbreak-
ing life-threatening situations that some individual in a war swept
country has had to go through. . . Are moral dilemmas really all
that unreal and artificial to us?
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